The
nineteenth century witnessed Great Britain’s abolition of the slave trade and
the events which afterwards occurred concerning the endeavors of the British
Royal Navy to suppress this profitable trade. Directly relating to this topic,
several historians during the past century have posed the question: how
effective was the Royal Navy in bringing an end to the slave trade? What
obstacles stood in their way and how were these overcome? A majority of
historians, overall, consent to the Royal Navy’s efforts being extremely
successful, but there are others who hesitate to make such a claim. Shifting trade routes and a multitude of
political roadblocks came into play, working against the navy. However, the status
and success of the British Navy in this time period certainly gave it headway
before these difficulties. Within the context of the nineteenth century, these
seemingly opposing factors—the shift of the trade route and the many political
roadblocks—will be addressed, in addition to the navy’s grand reputation, all
in regards to the effectiveness of the Royal Navy in suppressing the slave
trade.
Historiography
As
mentioned above, historians have questioned back and forth concerning the
Navy’s effectiveness in suppressing the trade. The difficulties facing the Navy
were briefly described by Brian Lavery in his work. Lavery’s book focuses on
firsthand accounts of men on board the Navy’s ships from the beginning of
British naval history, specifically (when obtainable) from the Lower deck
crewmen. For this reason, his address on the period of the Navy’s suppression
is limited and offers little opinion concerning the Navy’s level of
effectiveness. He does, however, make mention of the debate, bringing up
briefly an introduction on the difficulties faced by these men in attempting to
monitor three thousand miles worth of coastline with, initially, only about six
frigates and sloops being utilized.[1] E.
Phillip Leveen, though, who looked at the statistical patterns to analyze the
navy’s success level, ultimately argued for its effectiveness. He breaks it
down statistically—forty-five years (1820-1865) with 160,000 slaves retrieved
and 1500 ships stopped and taken to court—and according to his interpretation,
this certainly marks a success.[2]
Another take on the suppression, speculated by Edward A. Alpers and Benigna
Zimba, presents the argument that the navy merely caused a shifting of the
trade’s centers, and therefore, at least initially, made little headway.[3]
Overall, however, there is a greater amount of historians arguing for the
Navy’s success.
Some
of the more well-known historians in the field concerning the end of the slave
trade are Eric Williams, Christopher Lloyd, and William Ernest Frank Ward. Eric
Williams, a well-known historian on the topic of slavery, represents the
leading force in an alternate view concerning suppression policies. Williams
looks to economic reasons as being the motivation to both the rise and the fall
of the slave trade. He argues the bill of 1807 was not passed for humanitarian
purposes, but rather due to the economic benefit it would have for rising
capitalists.[4] Due to Williams’ view on the motivation
behind the abolition of the trade and the economic focus of his book, he
discusses very little concerning the Navy’s role in suppressing the trade. In
the brief mention he gives of these efforts, though, it is put simultaneously
with the world questioning the British Parliament on where their senses have
gone concerning the 1807 act. By placing it in the context, he reveals his
view, that such attempts of the navy were unrealistic and foolish. He concludes
this brief mention by pointing out, what he believes to be, wasted effort and
the overall ineffectiveness in decreasing the supply of slaves being shipped to
the Americas.[5]
In contrast, there are several historians, such as Christopher Lloyd and
William Ernest Frank Ward whose works solely focus on the navy’s efforts, and
they certainly attest to the Navy’s effectiveness in their accounts of the “Preventative
Squadron’s” efforts, a view seeming to be held by the majority of historians.
Background
After the passing of
the Abolition Act in March of 1807, a few more legal British slavers managed to
sail with slaves to the Americas before the bill was completely put into
effect. October 1807 marked the last few legal slave ships of Britain setting
sail from Sierra Leone. 1,100 Negroes were contained within these four ships
who the Royal Navy frigates accompanied. Not only did it mark the final time a
British
Shifting Trade Routes
The Royal Navy’s suppression efforts centered originally
on West Africa’s coastline. The majority of slaves had, up to the nineteenth
century, been supplied from the Western coastal cities of Africa since it
existed as the shortest distance from plantation colonies.[9]
Leveen, in his statistical analysis, recognizes though the rising growth of
slaves being supplied from alternate coasts of Africa. These new routes, formed
to avoid the patrols of the Royal Navy, originated from the central and
southwestern coasts.[10] This
new trade supply and alternate routes caused unforeseen complications and
dilemmas for Britain as they attempted to snuff out the slave trade. Alpers and
Zimba’s journal article, as stated before, dealt specifically with this issue.
This new supply had become necessary due to a high demand rising for additional
slaves in Brazil and Cuba.[11] Alpers
and Zimba discuss how this newly arising trade oriented in southeast Africa
became large and difficult to suppress for a long while, with new demands for
slaves emerging from new sources.[12]
Partly for this reason, then, despite the Navy’s presence in the Atlantic, the
slaves imported to the Americas actually grew in numbers throughout the first
half of the nineteenth century.[13]The
percentage of 21% is offered as the number of slaves arriving in Rio de Janeiro
who came from such Portuguese ports as Quelimane and Inhambane, in southeast
Africa.[14] The historian Christopher Lloyd also attests
to the great extent of this trade source on East Africa’s coast. He reports
that in 1824, on an annual basis, “15 slavers, each with some 500 slaves on
board” sailed from the southeastern
coast of Africa.[15]
Statistically speaking, then, it would seem the suppression attempts of the
Navy were far from effective initially.
The
first part of the nineteenth century witnessed an increase in demands for
slaves in new areas in order to answer the development of new plantations. Some
of these demands even arose from islands in the Indian Ocean, off the eastern
coast of Africa. Instances of this were seen on the French controlled islands
La Réunion and Île de France, where the land was being transformed into
locations for plantation systems. These plantations were reflective of those
found in the Caribbean, and therefore required slave labor to make the systems
productive. In addition to this demand springing from the Indian Ocean, Brazil
found a new, unpatrolled route for slavers from Mozambique to its own
plantations. This new route also resulted in Cape Town, in South Africa,
surging in their dealing with slaves due to its being a common stop en route
from Mozambique to Brazil.[16]
In summary of this matter, Alpers and Zimba remark that following 1807, “not
surprisingly, then from an area of little significance to the interests of
abolitionists focused on western Africa, southeast Africa and the southwest
Indian Ocean became an important area for their attention…”[17]
It is seen here, then, how the patrolling of British naval vessels along the
West African coast caused a re-direction of trade routes, which rose to a level
of importation rates that forced the navy to react.
In order to address these alternate routes, it became
necessary for the Royal Navy to expand their attempts of suppression. Parliament
also worked to assist the navy in expanding its reaches and began pursuing
agreements with Brazil and Cuba. 1820 and 1830 marked the end of legal slave
practices in Cuba and Brazil as a result of Britain’s pressure. This presented
traders with a double challenge in not only finding remaining interested
buyers, but also in having to bribe the right officials for the slaves to then
gain access into the country.[18]
This two-fold complication assisted in the eventual end of slaving vessels
traveling across the Atlantic.
The
actions of the Navy and Parliament certainly, eventually, began to have an impact on this alternate trade
route. Alpers and Zimba, however, are a bit harsher in their analysis, claiming
that any differences the navy made in the Mozambique Channel and the southwest
Indian Ocean were initially small and inconsequential. Even after the Navy’s
guaranteed presence in those waters following the 1842 Anglo-Portuguese treaty,
little real effectiveness ever occurred, according to their interpretation.
They point out that it was not until over fifty years later, in 1902, that the
final slave shipment was recorded to have embarked from the port Angoche in
Mozambique.[19]
Such a perspective is indeed a negative one, and while their facts might be
true, it must not be overlooked that a lack of involvement from Britain in
these waters would perhaps have seen an even further prolonged trade. Also, the
navy did, unarguably, contribute in stopping at least some number of slave
ships along the Southeastern coast of Africa and the surrounding area, even if
it took a number of years to see the final ship leave Mozambique’s shores.
Lloyd proposes a much more sound and positive analysis. He addresses how,
during the war with France in the beginning of the nineteenth century, the
French owned islands of La Réunion and Île de France began to be a source of
threats for the British colony of India. In order to combat this threat,
Britain obtained dominion over the Indian Ocean islands of Mascarenes and the
Seychelles. Ceylon, and of course, Cape Town, were also included in the areas
Britain took control of and their influence in these locations quickly helped
them to reach a place of dominating the majority of the Indian Ocean as well as
the Atlantic.[20]
This situation, then, set them up in a good position for combatting the slave
trade on the eastern shores of Africa.
While statistics originally cast a dire light on the
Royal Navy’s efforts, ultimately even the shifting of trade routes eventually
was not enough to counter suppression. The pressure applied by the navy on the
slave trade certainly did not see any immediate decrease in the amount of
Africans enslaved and transported within the first few decades of the
nineteenth century. However, it did seem to quickly alter the pricing of
slaves. Despite there being an increased amount of slaves imported, they were
more costly due to the added risk to slavers of being caught by the British
Navy.[21] Investors
in the slave trade began to need to calculate for probable losses. This
resulted in the increased cost of slaves who were successfully shipped across
the Atlantic in order to offset the losses from slave vessels who were caught
by navy patrols.[22]
Leveen explains the statistics which appear to show that the trade prospered
greatly in the period following the act of 1807. He states in his work, “in
changing the probability of loss, the navy thus caused profits (for any given
quantity of slave exports) to rise, thereby forcing the supply curve upward.”[23] Ultimately,
even the shifting of trade routes never proved to be enough of a setback to
render to British Royal Navy ineffective in history.
Political Roadblocks
In
order to successfully suppress the slave trade, the Navy was forced to face the
reality of several political issues. Parliament worked behind the Royal Navy’s
brute force endeavors, weaving political magic, but for several decades in the
first half of the nineteenth century, little visible progress was made.
Addressing all the different aspects of this topic would prove challenging,
therefore the focus here will center on at least a summary of two elemental
hindrances: the conniving plans of slavers and nations still practicing the
slave trade to avoid the British Navy’s capture of slaving vessels and the, seemingly
more surprising, difficulty in gaining support from within Africa itself to
oppose the trade. These two factors helped to create impediments which the
British Parliament and the Royal Navy worked slowly to overcome during the
nineteenth century.
The
slavers and nations, still eager to practice the slave trade and convinced of
its great profitability, worked in more than one way to avoid the Royal Navy’s
attempts to enforce suppression on the rest of the world. When the bill to
abolish the slave trade reached the House of Commons, arguments were presented
in regards to whether or not the bill would be enforced, and if so, would
Britain, then, take on the responsibility of preventing other nations’
participation in the trade. Certainly there was hope that Britain’s example
would set off a chain reaction, but if this did not occur, the trade would
simply continue without Britain gaining any of the profits.[24] Of
course, the bill was eventually passed and as far as enforcing it, Britain made
the bold move of creating their Preventative Squadron. Rather than setting the
standard of change, a general distaste arose among other nations for assisting
Britain in this campaign.[25]
Opposition of slave traders and the rest of the world began formulating
political strategies to avoid the roaming eyes of Britain’s Navy now posted
along the West African shoreline.
Slave
traders took many measures in attempts to avoid being captured. Because the
initial abolition of the slave trade concerned a matter of whether or not
traders could fly a British flag, the matter of nations’ flags became a center
of attack for the slavers and opposing nations. Slave vessels would cunningly
fly flag colors of nations which allowed them to escape capture by Britain due
to the treaties between Britain and these nations.[26]
Many countries assisted the slavers by issuing registration papers which gave
them the ability to claim exemption form the Royal Navy’s demands to search a
vessel. Political relations and agreements between Britain and other nations
were certainly not stationary, though, so this was not always the most
dependable means to avoid being caught.[27]
Thomas Buxton, a contemporary politician of the time period, attested to this
difficulty, though, and how many countries still allowing the trade would sell
flags and papers to any slave trader seeking them. He points out specifically
Portugal as a culprit of this bothersome practice. In addition, Buxton
describes the difficulties in forming treaties with other nations allowing the
British fleet to gain permission to search vessels with flags from those nations.
North America, he pointed out, as a nation particularly loath to grant such
permission.[28]
These opposing nations and determined slaver traders certainly kept Parliament
and the British Royal Navy occupied in attempting to stop them.
In
addition to the flags and registration papers being a political issue, problems
arose quickly from the treatment the Royal Navy showed toward slave vessels.
The navy approached their interception and capture of such vessels much as they
would an enemy ship. Upon capture, the vessel and its shipment were regarded as
the Navy’s prize money, according to their interpretation of orders. If a
protest was made concerning how the ship was claimed, the matter went to the
Admiralty Court. However, Britain was not as war with the nations sponsoring
these slavers, so this mentality of gaining the vessel and shipment as prize
money caused many issues.[29] The
nations protested against such action and justly claimed that Britain’s navy,
in many instances, had no right to treat vessels in such a manner.
While
the slave traders and nations opposing Britain’s suppression certainly
complicated matters for the navy, slowly these hindrances were overcome. Adrian
Hastings, a theologian professor who wrote a history on the church of Africa,
admitted to the lack of initial impact which the navy had upon suppression. He
goes so far as to claim that fewer slave traders were stopped than the number
which successfully reached the Americas when suppression attempts first began.
This is followed, however, with the acknowledgment that by the mid-nineteenth
century, definite, positive differences were seen in the number of slaves
imported.[30]
The British Parliament, following their abolition of the trade, attempted to
push and manipulate other nations in regards to seeing a global end to the
slave trade. For instance, Britain bargained with Brazil, agreeing to
acknowledge its independence if Brazil agreed to designate the importation of
slaves as illegal on its coast. This agreement occurred in 1831, yet it was not
until 1850 that Brazil completely saw its transatlantic slave trade become
illegal.[31]
These dates, again, back up Hastings point, that suppression attempts finally
seemed to take effect towards the later part of the nineteenth century. The
important factor, though, is that attempts were indeed successful.
Parliament
supported the navy extensively in efforts to overcome political complications.
Thomas Buxton’s work begins with a letter from a society formed solely with the
goal in mind of seeing an end to slavery in its entirety, and this letter
attests to an extensive amount being set aside “annually in supporting a considerable
force of cruizers in various parts of the globe, to intercept and destroy the
traffic.”[32]
In the midst of this description, an editor’s note indicates that total
expenses invested in these attempts totaled approximately fifteen millions
sterling.[33]
Parliament also passed bills allowing the navy more freedom in capturing
vessels. The Royal Navy, at first, could only take a slave vessel if slaves
were found on board, but fortunately this altered, to the point of allowing the
navy to accuse a ship of involvement in slave trading if any type of proper
evidence was discovered on board, such as slave manacles.[34] This
political support behind the navy greatly contributed to their efforts of
suppressing the trade.
The
Foreign Office within Britain played the biggest role when it came to
governmental assistance. As Lloyd states, it was the political efforts of the
Foreign Office combined with the British Navy enforcing such acts, treaties,
and agreements that contributed to the success in eventual suppression.[35]
During the nineteenth century, other nations involved in the slave trade slowly
began to submit with Spain in 1835 agreeing to no longer allow slave trader’s
vessels to fly their flag as protection. Portugal offered greater obstinacy in
this matter, resulting in an act in 1839 that any slavers caught by the British
Navy under a Portuguese flag found guilty of being involved in the slave trade
would be treated as British citizens in the matter of punishment administered
for their crime.[36]
France, one of the nations who also gave Britain considerable trouble in this
matter, also eventually, slowly began working with the Foreign Office of
Britain to gain an agreement. By 1845, France at least freely allowed British
Naval vessels to pull up alongside French ships in attempts to discern if the
vessel served as a slave trader’s ship. Not until 1882 did France finally
submit to a treaty granting Britain permission to formally search suspicious
vessels.[37]
Overall, the political impediments caused by slave traders and other nations
certainly played a great influence in the early apparent lack of effect of the
British Royal Navy’s vessels. Due to the work of Parliament, though, and the
navy’s constant efforts, such issues were overcome.
The
other major political obstacle was found inside Africa itself in the form of
African leaders who were mostly unwilling to cooperate with the British Navy.
The institution Buxton became involved in based itself around the plan of
wanting to open up the interior of Africa and introduce Christianity at large.
They believed this would be the only way to truly dissolve slavery. Within the
letter, then, it recognizes the need to establish treaties with African kings.[38]
Parliament also eventually took this stance, believing they could end the trade
by cutting off traders’ supplies. Joseph Dupuis was appointed as a diplomat of
sorts during this time period for the Ashantee people. In his case, the matter
actually involved a land claim of the Ashantee which Britain refuted, but the
account he gives after the events he experienced offer an inside look on the
king’s feelings concerning the slave trade. The King of Ashantee, Dupuis
describes, as not being able to understand why the European king no longer
asked for slaves, since, in Ashantee’s king’s view, it had been so beneficial
to each side.[39]
He describes the king’s response in this manner, “The king did not deem it
plausible, that this obnoxious traffic should have been abolished from motives
of humanity alone; neither would be admit that it lessened the number either of
domestic or foreign wars…”[40]
This attitude reveals the lack of interest among African kings to see an end to
this trade. Another firsthand account relating this same point is the work of
Rev. Hope Masterson Waddell. It describes the missionary efforts taking place
within Africa, and in one recounted event, the king of the missionaries’ region
claims to see slavery as a necessity for his people. He views it as a matter of
societal control and has no moral issues with owning slaves.[41]
Overall, then, there was seen a disinterest among the African kings, initially,
in agreeing to stop providing slaves for the traders.
The
Royal Navy, backed by Parliament yet again, continued however to pursue the
relation with African kings in hopes they could eventually, through bribery of
sorts, convince them to desist in supplying slaves for the trade. Ward gives an
account of one such instance, when a British commander of the HMS Wanderer, a Joseph Denman, not only
negotiated that the African king Siaka and his son Prince Manna release a
recent inhabitant of Sierra Leone whom they had captured, but also he
negotiated their assistance in submitting to him all the slaves held within the
barracoons of the region, and a promise from these African leaders to no longer
deal with slavers in the trade.[42]
Many dealings of the sort took place, some through perhaps rather forceful
negotiations and others in seemingly bribery. Slowly, but surely, then Britain
began to make headway. Acknowledging this, Hastings points out the factors
working on behalf of this lone nation:
No
European state possessed more forts along the African coast; no nation carried
in its ships more African slaves across the Atlantic; nowhere else in the world
was there such knowledge or such concern for Africa…. It was essentially a
British, and a London-centered movement.[43]
He is referring more to
the formation of the abolition movement to begin with, but the influence of
Britain remained a factor which allowed it to be one of the greatest opponents
to the slave trade. Overall, slave traders, nations still profiting from the
trade, and Africans themselves all opposed the trade. However, these factors
were not enough to stop the navy or hinder Parliament in formulating treaties
and agreements which allowed the Royal Navy to be effective.
The British Navy as a World Power
The Royal British Navy’s established reputation of the
nineteenth century certainly made it an elemental factor which allowed the
navy’s suppression of the slave trade to be successful. In passing the act of
1807, some Parliamentary figures protested this would mean the loss of Navy
seamen’s training ground, of sorts. It was common and to be expected that any
seaman, in gaining experience, would at some time or another serve on board a
slave vessel.[44]
Due to the notable efficiency of British navy crew members contributing to the
navy’s greatness, political leaders being concerned over those crews losing
their experience is certainly understandable. The historian G.J. Marcus, who
writes an account of England’s naval history, attests to the navy’s unrivaled
reputation as the leading sea power in the world. He reflects on events such as
the War of Spanish Succession in Europe as a significant marker in the British
Navy’s development. During the years of this war, other navy powers in Europe
decline—such as the French navy’s decline—which gave Britain’s navy the upper
hand in this early eighteenth century conflict.[45] The
British Navy rising as a world power during this period was an undebatable fact
for Marcus, and inevitably assisted in making the navy more effective in their
suppression attempts.
Another
historian who writes geared towards naval history also agrees with this rapidly
rising repute of the Royal Navy of Great Britain. The century leading up to the
1807’s abolition of the slave trade saw a steady increase in the Royal Navy’s
position. More dockyards and ships were being built utilizing modern
techniques. A great deal of money was invested into the navy by Parliament
because they understood the navy’s importance in making Britain a force in the
world to be reckoned with.[46] The
era in which navy vessels were sent out to help suppress the slave trade was in
the midst of its greatest time of glory. Admiral
The
status of the navy and the types of ships used assisted greatly in their
effectiveness. The, as there were sometimes labeled, “West African Squadron”
were not made up of the larger ships of the line which were developed to hold
more guns and larger crews. Instead, the vessels included in the squadron were
mostly smaller, such as fourth to sixth rate frigates. These normally were not
near so heavily armed, bearing only fifty to twenty-four guns in comparison to
the ships which bore one hundred to seventy-four guns.[49].
Overall, the generally smaller vessels used in the Preventative Squadron
assisted them in being faster, the ideal characteristic for these ships whose
mission was to chase down slave traders. These missions were reported, by one
officer serving on board such a vessel, to be quite supported by the sailors,
who felt they either were doing something honorary and noble in freeing slaves,
or were at least eager for the possible profit to be made from prize money. Pulled from
Colburn’s United Service Magazine and Naval and Military Journal, the officer
recollected,
Among
seamen I believe the African Preventative Service to be generally popular. The frequent
excitement of chasing; the variety of boat service; the relaxation of the
prize-crews; and the prospect of prize-money at the end of the commission are
so many inducements to men to serve on the African coast.[50]
While Lavery attests to
navy officers, in comparison, finding the work often tedious or dull,[51]
the feeling of the sailors certainly would have impacted the amount of effort
they put into the chasing down of slave vessels. Any man fighting for a cause
is inclined to serve harder in their line of duty. Between these not so heavily
armed frigates (normally giving them more speed) and the high spirits of the
men, the British Navy became successful in their suppression efforts.
Other vessels were often used to render the Royal Navy as
more effective. Besides the frigates, sloops and brigs were also used. Sloops
held about sixteen to twenty guns and played a very important role in
suppression. Ward even labelled them, “the backbone of the West African
squadron.”[52]
The reason behind this weighty role they played was due to their speed, which
came in handy when chasing down slave ships. The sloop also was heavily armed
enough to the point where they could not only catch up to a slave ship, but
also bring it to a forced stop. Brigs were even smaller than sloops and could
have as few as two guns or as many as twenty. While many brigs were useful in
their speed, if not designed well, they easily became good for nothing—slow and
too lightly armed to do damage.[53]
These smaller vessels, then, truly were the ones who made all the difference in
the attack against slavery at sea. The largest of ships were very rarely
utilized, due to the common knowledge of the navy that such vessels were
considerably slower, and therefore, the great multitude of guns would quickly
be rendered useless as soon as a smaller trader outran it. Throughout the
nineteenth century, marking the Industrial Revolution in progress on British
shores, slow transformation occurred for the navy at sea. Steam-powered ships
began to rise to prominence towards the latter half of the century, making the
need obious for the Navy to implement changes in their workmanship. The West
African Squadron, while not greatly impacted, certainly witnessed some of this.
By 1842 five steam-powered ships were included in the squadron, but on these
early ships, it was merely a back-up power. In the years of suppression, then,
vessels remained wooden and still moved about almost entirely by their sails
harnessing wind power.[54] These
vessels of the Royal Navy, above any other factor, certainly are what the
ranking of the navy’s effectiveness comes down to, and these said ships, when
put to the test were not found wanting. It is not without reason that
historians generally all refer to the British Royal Navy, during this time
period, as “the acknowledged mistress of the seas.”[55]
Such a reputation, and the reputation being validated as true by these vessels,
certainly contributed to the eventual suppression of the slave trade on the
Atlantic.
Conclusion
Ultimately,
as seen through the factors of allowing for shifting trade routes by slave
traders, the political battle behind the navy’s work, and the grand status of
the British Royal Navy, the efforts of the navy to suppress the slave trade
must generally be acknowledged to have been effective. Certainly, other factors
could be analyzed in order to further test this question, such as the high rank
of sailor deaths for those who served on patrolling vessels so near the shores
of Africa. However, the factors addressed seem to serve as some of the most
significant. It is important to remember, though, in this conclusion, that
summing up the navy’s work as either completely “effective” or “ineffective,”
as a whole is a rather naïve point. As Laveen points out in his work, “The
problem of estimating the impact of the navy is one of determining what would
have happened if its influence had not been employed to suppress the slave
trade.”[56]
Obviously, as he points out, there is no real way of knowing exactly how much
of an impact the navy truly had because one is unable to know what the trade
might have looked like in the nineteenth century without the navy’s suppression
attempts. It can, however, be strongly argued, that the force of the Mistress
of the Seas during the nineteenth century certainly did bring the slave trade
to a more rapid end.
[1] Brian Lavery, Royal Tars: The
Lower Deck of the Royal Navy, 875-1850, (Maryland: Naval Institute Press,
2010), 295-6.
[2] E. Phillip Leven, British Slave
Trade Suppression Policies, 1821-1865 (New York: Arno Press, 1977), 1-2.
[3] Edward A. Alpers and Benigna
Zimba, “British Abolition in Southeast Africa: The First 50 Years,” Quarterly Bulletin of the National Library
of South Africa 63, no. ½ (2009): 5-15, Academic
Search Premier, EBSCOhost
(accessed November 8, 2013), 5.
[4] Eric Williams, Capitalism & Slavery (New York:
Capricorn Books Ed., 1966), 169.
[5] Williams, 173-4.
[6] Siân Rees, Sweet Water and Bitter: The Ships that Stopped the Slave Trade,
(Durham, NH: University of New Hampshire Press, 2011), 8.
[8] Rees, 25.
[9] Alpers, 1.
[10] Leveen, 11.
[11] Lavery, 246.
[13] Lavery, 246.
[14] Alpers, 6.
[15] Christopher Lloyd, The Navy and
the Slave Trade: The Suppression of the African Slave Trade in the Nineteenth
Century (London: Frank Cass and Company, Ltd., 1968), 190.
[16] Alpers, 5.
[18] Leveen, 33.
[20] Lloyd, 191-192.
[21] Laveen, 7-9.
[23] Leveen, 23.
[24] W.E.F. Ward, The Royal Navy and the Slavers: The Suppression of the Atlantic Slave
Trade ( New York: Schocken Books, 1970), 16.
[25] Lavery, 245.
[26] Lavery, 245.
[27] Leveen, 28.
[28] Sir Thomas Fowell Buxton, The African Slave Trade and its Remedy, (London:
J. Murray Publishing, 1840), http://books.google.com/books (accessed November
25, 2013), 202-207.
[29] Rees, 17.
[30] Adrian Hastings, The Church in Africa: 1450-1950 (New
York: Oxford University Press Inc.., 1996), 184.
[32] Buxton, 2.
[33] Ibid, 2.
[34] Lavery, 245.
[36] Lloyd, 47-48.
[37] Lloyd, 49-50.
[38] Buxton, 2.
[39] Joseph Dupuis, Journal of a Residence in Ashantee
(London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1966), 13-14.
[40] Dupuis, 162.
[41] Rev. Hope Masterson Waddell, Twenty-nine Years in the West Indies and
Central Africa: A Review of Missionary Work and Adventure, 1829-1858,
(London: T. Nelson and Sons, Paternoster Row, 1863), 428-430.
[43] Hastings, 175.
[45] G.J. Marcus, A Naval History of
Engla
[46] Daniel A. Baugh, British Naval
Administration in the Age of Walpole (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1965), 495-6.
[47] Ward, 22.
[49] Ward,25.
[50] Colburn’s United Service
Magazine and Naval and Military Journal, Vol 1: PP 578-9, (London: Myers and
Co., Printers, 1849).
[52] Ward,25-27.
[54] Ward, 37.
[55] Baugh, 505.
